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Introduction: Brown, Triumph or Challenge?
Henry W. McGee Jr.1
News of Brown v. Board of Education2 reached me nearly a month before
I graduated with a journalism degree from Northwestern University’s
Medill School of Journalism. Standing in the school’s Daily Northwestern
offices, I heard the old-style AP wire ticker tape bells noisily signal a major
news story, one whose decibel level was as loud as the signal of the Titanic
disaster, D-Day, the end of World War II, and other such watershed events.3
Though there was a sense of elation among the few progressive white
students and nearly all of the thirty or so Negro (to use fifties speech)
students at Northwestern, as I remember events from this fifty year distance,
there was neither general consternation nor celebration over Brown.
Although I was not yet a lawyer, I do remember one or two white students
congratulating me as though I had “won.”4 Back at home in Chicago’s
Negro community, I don’t remember anyone thinking that we had anything
to bank on yet.
On campus, some progressive administrators had already demonstrated
impatience with the racial mores of the North and previously, during my
junior year in 1953, the administrators had decided to scatter African
American students through University housing, thereby ending the system
of consigning us to our “own” dormitory. That year, I was voted the first
African American president of my dormitory, Foster House, and I was
elected as the first African American in the history of Northwestern to the
Student Governing Board. These successes were limited, however. As one
of only two blacks in the journalism school at Northwestern, not much
changed for me with the announcement of the Supreme Court decision. As
my grandmother put it, Brown or no Brown, there were just three things I
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could count on as obligations in life: staying “colored,” paying taxes, and
dying.
During the 1950s, and presumably for a time before, only one African
American had been admitted to the journalism school about every four
years.5 As I neared graduation, I was the only member of my class who did
not get, or who could not get, an interview when employers solicited
Northwestern seniors. Thus, after a year as news editor for the Associated
Negro Press, a news service that relied upon the mail to contact its
subscribers, I decided to abandon plans to be a journalist. Instead, I opted
for law school, which like medical or dental school, was a professional
escape hatch for generations of African Americans who would otherwise be
consigned to work in the “community” or, as did my father, at the Post
Office.6
In other signs of the times, white students at Northwestern were
supporting African Americans by insisting on service for them at some of
the more well-known restaurants in Evanston and Chicago that historically
served only whites. These efforts met with some success, and they
prefigured the struggles of the sixties in which white and African American
students waged civil disobedience against a segregated America. Well
before Brown was implemented in many cities, the civil rights struggle was
underway in both the North and South. The struggle transformed the racial
landscape of the United States, even though eventually it would be argued
that millions of African Americans were as segregated before Brown as
before Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.7 Eventually, that struggle constituted a
national call to action for African Americans and progressive whites to
journey South to attack the visible symbols of African American oppression
and degradation, namely the legally imposed racial apartheid and the extralegal disenfranchisement of millions of African American southerners.8
Immediately upon hearing the Brown decision, there was a general sense
of betrayal, frustration, heartbreak, and fury experienced by many southern
whites and many of their political and economic leaders.9 But even ten
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years after the decision, only 1.17 percent of African American school
children attended racially integrated schools in the eleven states that
maintained de jure segregated schools.10 The desegregation of Central High
School in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957, had to be enforced by the 101st
Airborne, which was an elite army unit that had last been deployed against
the racists of Nazi Germany in Normandy in 1944.11 What followed is too
weary a tale, too well known to recount. But in the end, the national retreat
from integration extended to the Supreme Court itself in the Milliken v.
Bradley decision, which essentially insulated “innocent” whites and
“innocent” suburban school districts from desegregation.12 Legal retreat
was accompanied by massive white abandonment of public school systems
for private or parochial schools.13
Legal historian Michael J. Klarman has argued that Brown was essential
in the transition from the old order but that the Court alone lacked the
power to desegregate recalcitrant school systems.14 For Klarman, Brown
spurred a process in which African Americans challenged the status quo,
and racists resorted to grotesque tactics to suppress the revolt.15 As the
southern white establishment generated moral outrage in the rest of the
nation and throughout the world, civil disobedience and the moral example
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. were as important as Brown in dooming the
legally ordained humiliation and oppression of African Americans. Thus,
Brown was a critical phase and a condition precedent to the abolition of
legalized racial segregation. But, Brown was as much a catalyst as it was
engine of social change. Despite the prolonged interregnum between the
decision and its implementation, and despite its ultimate near failure in
desegregating public schools, Brown and its progeny vitiated the
constitutional basis upon which Jim Crow was premised.16
Derrick Bell’s convergence theory, reformulated in his recent book
published on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Brown, more than
plausibly explains the “why” of Brown and the epoch in which the case was
decided, even if his theory does not neatly explain every bend in the river of
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racial change in the history of the United States.17 Indeed, the Soviet Union
and its pretensions of world domination made Brown a political necessity if
the United States was to lead the “free world.”18 Specifically, the United
States could not boast of a free society if that freedom was premised on the
subjugation of millions of citizens solely because they were classified as
racially inferior. As a kind of silent amicus, the Soviet Politburo and its
machinations made continued suppression of African Americans politically
unsustainable if the “American way” was to win over a world in which an
overwhelming number of its inhabitants were, in various hues and shades,
dark of skin.19
In addition to the cold war competition with the Soviet Union, Brown
was preceded by a growing impatience in the legal establishment with the
decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the tragic farce of “separate but
equal.” And in some instances, starting with Brown v. Mississippi20 in the
1930s and culminating with Shelley v. Kramer21 in the 1940s, the Court
commenced a retreat from the shameful Plessey v. Ferguson22 validation of
racial segregation.
As the symbolic and practical outcomes of the decision demanded, the
fiftieth anniversary of Brown was the occasion of celebrations and
commemorations throughout the United States. In April 2004, the Seattle
University School of Law, the Seattle Journal for Social Justice, and the
Seattle University Law Review co-sponsored a two-day symposium entitled
“From Brown to Grutter: Racial Integration and the Law in the
Northwest.”23 The conference examined not only Brown’s impact on de
facto school segregation and race relations in Seattle and the Northwest, but
it also encompassed Brown’s national significance and the manner in which
the decision spawned legal and social change throughout the United States
for both African Americans and other minority groups suffering from
discrimination and other forms of diminished citizenship.
The current issue of the Journal features a lively cross-section of essays
from this Seattle University symposium; the issue’s analysis and
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explorations of the case will at once broaden and challenge the knowledge
base of all readers.
Professor John C. Brittain probes the response of minority groups to
white resistance to racial integration. In his telling article, A Look at Brown
v. Board of Education in 2054,24 he points out that racial minorities who are
faced with de facto discrimination on a national scale and who are frustrated
with the pace of change, have retreated from the struggle for integrated
schools and shifted their efforts to other arenas including demands for
increased funding, closure of the achievement gap between the races, and
better educational facilities.25 Professor Brittain grimly predicts a future of
even greater decline in racial integration. He judiciously argues that racial
and educational equality for children of color will only be realized if society
views the moral imperative of educational equality as economic necessity.26
In Neither Separate nor Equal: How Race-Sensitive Enforcement of
Criminal Laws Threatens to Undo Brown v. Board of Education,27
Professor Christian Halliburton analyzes the residual impacts of Brown in
the nation’s criminal justice system. Professor Halliburton’s nuanced
argument is that the separate but equal doctrine subtly survives in putatively
colorblind norms which are used to perpetuate the differential treatment of
African Americans, Latinos, and other citizens of color.28 Brown, he
argues, was ineffective in changing the minds and hearts of the dominant
majority in the United States.29 After discussing the inequalities of the
death penalty, Professor Halliburton focuses his attention upon the manner
in which Seattle drug laws are disproportionately enforced against African
Americans.30 His essay closes with a provocative exploration of how black
sexuality is impacted by legal institutions.31
Dr. Thomas T. Romero II explores the implications of the sometimes
overlooked, but critically important, decision in Keyes v. School District
No. 1.32 He suggests that much more was involved than just the classic case
of white/black schools, and that, in fact, Mexican Americans articulated a
much different vision of integration than African Americans had fought for
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in the South.33 In his article, Our Selma is Here,34 Dr. Romero contends
that the Denver School Board made school boundary decisions and
formulated attendance policies that exacerbated the effects of residential
segregation in multicultural districts, but the School Board never
contemplated issues created by decision makers and judges in thrall to a
black/white paradigm.35 Dr. Romero demonstrates that Keyes and its
application in Denver collapsed the cultural and ideological differences
between the competing ethnic groups in the city while presciently warning
that the color line36 problems of the twenty-first century are issues of
tri/multi ethnicity.37
A month after Seattle University’s symposium, to commemorate the
Brown decision, the Loren Miller Bar Association of Seattle38 held a series
of panel discussions at Seattle University and a ceremony at the University
of Washington in which the nine Justices of the Washington State Supreme
Court reenacted the deliberations of the United States Supreme Court on the
day that Brown was argued.39 The distinguished trial lawyer, Mr. Lembhard
Howell,40 stood in the role of the architect of desegregation, Thurgood
Marshall. In addition, the Honorable John C. Coughenour of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington played the role
of John W. Davis, one of the most renowned constitutional lawyers in the
United States who represented precedent, the legal consensus of the day,
and the forces of segregation.
Although the logistics of staging the two events were significant, more
difficult still was reaching a consensus among the Bar Association’s
planners on how to describe Brown. In the “half-empty, half-full”
discussion about Brown’s impact on African Americans that preceded the
selection of its eventual title, “Brown: An American Triumph—Past,
Present and Future,” a difference of opinion arose among Seattle’s African
American lawyers over the significance and the impact of Brown. The
passionate but collegial discussions revealed marked differences of opinion
as various people grappled with the question that concerns this issue of the
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Journal. As the planners contemplated the success of Brown, they debated
whether it was a momentous leap forward, or an unfulfilled promise whose
effects have been ephemeral, symbolic, and transient. As NAACP Legal
and Educational Fund lawyer Derrick W. Black has argued,
For those advocates who brought Brown to fruition, it was the
culmination of several incremental steps aimed at reversing the
social order and abolishing the misconception—from schools to
the segregated train cars of Plessey—that this nation could be
“separate but equal” . . . . The battle was waged in schools . . . yet
[schools] still symbolized wide-spread segregation in society.
Understanding this context, the legacy of Brown cannot be
evaluated merely by the history and current status of desegregation
and equal opportunity on our schools. Rather, we must account for
how the racial caste system in America has changed . . . .41
Issues of caste and class were at the heart of the Bar Association’s
discussions about Brown, and the decision about what to name the event
was not reached quickly. Brown was truly momentous if it undermined the
legal foundations of racial discrimination and robbed the American caste
system of its constitutional underpinnings. But, as long as it was “legal” to
subject African Americans to social ostracism and institutionalized
deprivation of economic and social resources, African Americans were
doomed to remain “outcaste.” In Nobel Laureate Toni Morrison’s powerful
words,
If there were no black people in this country, it would have been
Balkanized. The immigrants would have torn each other’s throats
out, as they have done everywhere else. But in becoming an
American, from Europe, what one has in common with other
immigrants is contempt for me—it’s nothing else but color.
Wherever they came from, they would stand together. They could
all say, “I am not that.” So in that sense, becoming an American is
based on an attitude: an exclusion of me.42
True, the segregation of African Americans neither began nor ended with
segregation’s legal or constitutional status. But outlawing segregation did
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not lead to racial integration for the great majority of African Americans, in
schools or out. Indeed, Brown and the civil rights struggle have split, even
splintered, African America, and for its majority, produced a social order
which remains essentially segregated. For example, the Harvard University
Civil Rights Project concludes the following:
While public school enrollment reflects the country’s growing
diversity, our analysis of the nation’s large school districts
indicates a disturbing pattern of growing isolation, . . . decreasing
black and Latino exposure to white students is occurring in almost
every large district as well as declining white exposure to blacks
and Latinos in almost one-third of large districts. Black and Latino
students display high levels of segregation from white students in
many districts. This is due in part to small white percentages in
these districts.43
Indeed, nearly all of the major school systems are overwhelmingly
composed of minorities, with no meaningful white enrollment.44
Space does not permit a discussion of all of the other disadvantages that
accrue to the vast majority of African Americans. Among these
disadvantages is the grim reality that there are more African American men
in prison than are enrolled in institutions of higher learning.45
Harvard Professor Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. writes that
Brown I [was] a momentous decision both for what it says and for
what it has achieved. . . . Brown I should be celebrated for ending
de jure segregation in this country—a blight that lasted almost four
hundred years and harmed millions of Americans of all races. Far
too many African-Americans, however, have been left behind,
while only a relative few have truly prospered. For some, the
promise of integration has proved ephemeral. For others, shortterm gains have been replaced by setbacks engendered by new
forms of racism.46
The tension between the formal abolition of legalized caste and the
quotidian routine of African Americans, no matter their class, indeed was
the crux of the debate between those members of the Seattle African
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American Bar Association who thought Brown was a triumph, and those
who thought America remained racially-challenged. The triumph was
celebrated by name in the program, but members of the Bar agreed that the
triumph is complex.
For instance, though many African Americans earn salaries comparable
to white Americans, Melvin Oliver and his colleague Thomas Shapiro have
described the plight of an upper middle class black as high in salary, low in
assets.47 While superstars such as Secretary of State Colin Powell and
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas command national authority, and
famed athletes and motion picture celebrities too numerous to mention
grace advertisements on television screens, poverty and lack of resources
plague most urban areas. Meanwhile, the situation in rural areas does not
differ greatly as the loss of farmland among African American farmers
continues apace.48
Perhaps it can be argued that the elimination of caste and the institution
of opportunity for a very few was a necessary prelude to change, no matter
how glacial, for the many. There can be no doubt that Brown changed
much in the United States. The distinguished constitutional scholar, Cass
Sunstein has written that attending all-black schools differs from “. . . living
under a legal system that announces on a daily basis that some children are
not fit to be educated with others. Brown ruled that . . . states may not
humiliate a class of people that way.”49 Thus, Sunstein declares that Brown
justifies a “celebration” even if it does not “justify triumphalism.”50
What follows gives readers a chance to participate in the question that is
Brown. The articles ponder the depth and significance of the case and its
ramifications for race relations in the United States. What W.E.B. Du Bois
called the enduring question of the past century, the question of the color
line, is now the challenge of the twenty-first century.51
1

Henry W. McGee Jr. is Professor of Law at Seattle University School of Law and
Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Los Angeles. He received his B.S. in
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Journalism from Northwestern University in 1954; his J.D. from DePaul University in
1957; and his LL.M. from Columbia University in 1970.
2
347 U.S. 483 (1954). This introductory article concerns Brown I and covers Brown II,
349 U.S. 294 (1955) by implication. In Brown II, the Supreme Court undermined Brown
I by making the sphinx-like declaration that desegregation must proceed “with all
deliberate speed.” Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. As the Introduction and the articles that
follow in this volume make clear, “all deliberate speed” meant to some “as slowly as
possible,” and to others, “never.” Michael Klarman observes that
[Brown II] was a solid victory for white southerners. Although they did not
convince the Court to repudiate [Brown I] or to explicitly authorize district
judges to delay desegregation based on hostile community sentiment, they won
on every other issue. The Court-approved gradualism imposed no deadlines
for beginning or completing desegregation, issued vague guidelines, and
entrusted (southern) district judges with broad discretion. Southern politicians
lauded [Brown II] as a ‘very definite victory for the South,’ and newspapers
called it, ‘a distinct triumph for the southern viewpoint.’
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 318 (2004).
3
J. Harvie Wilkinson contends that “Brown may be the most important political, social,
and legal event in America’s twentieth century history. Its greatness lay in the enormity
of the injustice it condemned, in the entrenched sentiment it challenged, in the immensity
of law it both created and overthrew.” J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO
BAAKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954–1978, at 6 (1978).
4
According to Richard Kluger:
The reaction [to Brown] in the African American community was muted.
There was no dancing on the tables in Harlem. Race leaders such as Ralph
Bunche were pleased but cautious in their comments. Commendatory
editorials appeared throughout the black press, to be sure, along with calls for
prayers of thanksgiving, but the mood of overall wariness in black America
was suggested by the Courier’s columnist Nat D. Williams, writing out of
Beale Street in Memphis. ‘There was no general ‘hallelujah,’ ‘tis done’
hullabaloo on Beale Street in Memphis over the Supreme Court’s admission
that segregation in the public schools is wrong,’ wrote Williams. . . . Too many
proclamations of white America’s good intentions had reached African
American ears in the past to permit premature celebration now.
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 713 (First Vintage Books Ed. 2004)
(New York: Knopf 1976).
5
The African American who was a freshman while I was a graduating senior, Dr. Troy
Duster, is now the President of the American Sociological Association and a professor of
sociology at New York University as well as Chancellor’s Professor at the University of
California, Berkeley. Like me, he did not pursue journalism as his life’s work.
6
In 1966, President Lyndon Johnson appointed Henry W. McGee Sr., with consent of
the Senate, to be Postmaster of Chicago. He was the first African American named to be
Postmaster of a major metropolitan facility, and is thought to be the first person of any
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race in the U.S. to have entered the postal system as a clerk and raised to the rank of
Postmaster.
7
See H. W. McGee Jr., The Dream That Will Not Die: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the
Continuing American Revolution, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 453 (1988) (book review).
“Real desegregation began only when the democratic process demanded it—through the
1964 Civil Rights Act and aggressive enforcement by the Department of Justice, which
threatened to deny federal funding to segregated school systems.” Cass R. Sunstein, Did
Brown Matter?, NEW YORKER MAG., Apr. 29, 2004, at 103. See KEVIN J. MCMAHON,
RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO
BROWN (2004) (The assault on racial segregation can be traced to Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Because of the South’s importance to the Democratic Party, Roosevelt did not openly
challenge political views of segregationists, but in his appointments to the federal bench
he severed the historic influence the South had on the federal judiciary. Even before
World War II, the Roosevelt Justice Department moved against lynching, police violence,
and voting restrictions in the South. Federal judges also began to protect Negroes.).
After President Roosevelt died, President Truman abolished segregation in the armed
forces in 1948, thus establishing equality of treatment and opportunity in the Armed
Services. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948). See also Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (citing the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to reverse a conviction based on a coerced confession in which the
defendant was brutally tortured).
8
For example, in the summer of 1964, hundreds of black and white students went South
for the Mississippi Summer of Freedom, spearheaded by the Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee and the National Lawyers Guild. The author was granted leave
by the Chicago law firm of Jesmer and Harris to serve in Mississippi as a lawyer
representing students and residents who had demonstrated, and in some cases students
and residents who had attempted to register to vote. For compelling accounts of the
heroic struggle of blacks and whites against southern apartheid, see HOWARD ZINN,
SNCC, THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS (1964) and Nicholas Lehmann, The Long March, NEW
YORKER MAG., Feb. 10, 2003, at 86.
9
Daniel M. Berman wrote that
[c]ongressmen from the South launched a campaign to annul the decision of
the Supreme Court. Their efforts were climaxed in 1956 by the issuance of a
Declaration of Constitutional Principles, signed by more than one hundred
Representatives and Senators. In the strongest terms, the Southern Manifesto,
as this document came to be called, recommended that a major effort be made
“to bring about [the] reversal of the 1954 decision. That decision, it charged,
was devoid of any legal basis and directly ‘contrary’ to the Constitution.” Not
content to condemn the decision, . . . the signers of the Manifesto also sought
to discredit the Court that had rendered [the decision]. The Justices, they said,
had been guilty of a “clear abuse of judicial power”; they had “substituted their
personal, political, and social ideas for the established law of the land” [and]
they had exercised “naked judicial power” . . . it was probably no accident that
organizations like the Ku Klux Klan experienced a dramatic revival.
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DANIEL M. BERMAN, IT IS SO ORDERED: THE SUPREME COURT RULES ON SCHOOL
SEGREGATION 124–125 (1966).
10
Cass R. Sunstein asked
[i]n 1960, on the sixth anniversary of the Brown decision, how many of the 1.4
million African American children in the Deep South states of Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina attended racially mixed
schools? Answer: Zero. Even in 1964, a decade after Brown, more than
ninety-eight percent of African American children in the South attended
segregated schools.
Sunstein, supra note 7, at 103.
11
In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court held that the constitutional
right to equal protection may not be denied because of violent opposition or the
possibility of disorder. President Eisenhower, who did not lend his personal support to
integration efforts, nonetheless had no alternative but to order the army division to escort
nine black teenagers into Little Rock, Arkansas’ Central High School. See W.H.
Lawrence, Eisenhower Irate: Says Federal Orders ‘Cannot Be Flouted With Impunity’,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1957, at 1.
12
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (the Court insulated “white flighters”
from integrated schools, holding five-to-four that suburban school districts could not be
forced to integrate their schools with schools within the city limits that they bordered).
Professor Laurence Tribe notes this as the first time that the Supreme Court allowed a
segregated result where it found a constitutional violation. LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1495 (2d ed. 1988). Derrick Bell describes the
decision as a “double blow.” DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 567
(3d ed. 1992). “It not only upset a carefully prepared program designed by integration
proponents to effectively desegregate large, increasingly black urban school districts, but
also broke the Court’s two-decade-old record of not reversing an affirmative school
desegregation order [by a lower court].” Id.
13
A friend of Professor Mari Matsuda wrote the following to her:
Very few of us sent our kids to our neighborhood public elementary schools,
especially if those schools have high percentages of poorer kids, immigrants,
and limited-English kids. Here’s what most our friends did: 1. sent their kids to
private schools; 2. moved to a district that had good public schools; 3. used
superior knowledge and connections to send their kids to better alternative
public schools and magnet schools. . . . The folks I’m talking about are public
interest lawyers, NLG members, partners in minority law firms, founders and
board and staff of community organizations, etc., and me.
Mari Matsuda, Beyond Black, White, and Brown: A Forum, NATION MAG., May 3, 2004,
at 17, 18–19.
14
KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 443–468.
15
Id.
16
“Jim Crow” was the mythical name given to the institution of racial segregation, in
which the combined forces of physical brutality, social coercion, economic deprivation
and political disenfranchisement were instruments in the subjugation and degradation of
African Americans. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW
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(3d ed. 1974). Nicolas Lehman laments that “[i]t seems almost too obvious to mention
that during Jim Crow black people in the South did not have reliable recourse to the legal
system; even if most whites were benign, those who weren’t could do anything they
wanted to a Negro and get away it.” Lehmann, supra note 8, at 88.
In general, the Court in Brown narrowed its discussion to school segregation,
but in one of the most often quoted passages of its decision, even the Court
hinted that it was confronting a racial hierarchy and, at the very least, made
clear that it was deciding an issue that went to the core of basic opportunity in
our society. . . . [Passages in the decision] illustrated that Brown would be
about more than just education: it would determine whether African
Americans were going to have the opportunity to participate as full citizens in
this society.
Derrick W. Black, Beyond Brown: Its Impact Upon American Education and Culture,
NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 14.
17
See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004). Bell first articulated his convergence
theory in Brown v. Board and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518
(1980), where he argues that racial progress in the United States is precisely synchronized
(and limited) to the occasions that racial equity is in the interests of whites. In the case of
Brown, the timing was such that school segregation could hardly be maintained if the
United States was to win the propaganda war with the Soviet Union. See id.
18
See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 101 (2000).
19
Dudziak chronicles how in the Justice Department’s brief in Brown, Secretary of State
Dean Acheson claimed that racial discrimination gave unfriendly governments “the most
effective kind of ammunition for their propaganda warfare,” and remained “a source of
constant embarrassment to this Government in the day-to-day conduct of its foreign
relations.” Id. at 100, 101. See also Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War
Imperative, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 110 (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995). The distinguished constitutional law scholar Cass R. Sunstein finds support for
the Bell thesis in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the case which upheld the
University of Michigan’s affirmative action program promoting racial and ethnic
diversity declaring that such a program serves a compelling state interest. See Sunstein,
supra note 7, at 105. Sunstein points out that the Supreme Court referred to briefs it had
received from businesses and former military leaders, arguing that affirmative action was
necessary for both corporate success and national defense. Id.
20
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
21
334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the
ubiquitous restrictive covenants which forbade property owners from selling their
property to “Negroes,” and often other persons of color. See id. at 20.
22
163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy placed the imprimatur of the Supreme Court on racial
segregation/discrimination in its holding that “separate but equal” was not a violation of
the 14th Amendment’s “Equal Protection” clause, and therefore it was perfectly legal for
a conductor on a railroad train to eject Plessey, a colored passenger, before the train
reached a station. See id. at 548, 549. Ironically, Mr. Plessy was a New Orleans
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“mulatto” who appeared to be racially white, but it is thought that the train conductor
either recognized him or otherwise had it called to his attention that the passenger was
illegally sitting in a coach reserved only for whites.
23
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